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COMMERCIAL BANKS AS A MECHANISM AGAINST FINANCING TERRORISM 
 
In the process of globalization, the need to block 
financial flows to terrorist organizations is becoming 
more and more tangible. The fight against terrorist fi-
nancing is becoming a national and supranational prio- 
rity, and credit institutions are among the main mecha-
nisms for committing such crimes, and are therefore 
covered by numerous regulations and institutions con-
cerning their role in controlling and preventing them. 
The purpose of this study is to outline the commercial 
banks' place in terrorist financing processes by present-
ing their inherent characteristics within the scope of the 
Special Act on Measures Against Financing of Terro- 
rism. 
 
*** 
Pursuant to the Law on Credit Institutions1, the 
Bank makes public borrowing or other repayable funds 
and provides loans or other funding at its own expense 
and at its own risk, which is sufficient to justify the suit-
ability of an adequate risk management in the security 
sphere of the credit institution itself; of the interests of 
its clients. In this respect, commercial banks can be de-
fined as institutions with a significant role in the socio-
economic life of each country, their financial stability 
and effective management are among the main prere- 
quisites for competitiveness and market growth, and 
their absence leads to a number of risks, including legal, 
operational and reputational ones. 
In view of the issue under consideration, the acti- 
vities of credit institutions, the implementation of re-
lated legislation, internal policies and work procedures 
are subject to constant monitoring due to the potential 
for them to be used for the purpose of criminalization in 
the Criminal Code - financing terrorism, which could 
also be a prerequisite for the eventual occurrence of 
risky situations. In addition, it is precisely the specific 
activity of credit institutions that the special legal frame-
work – Law on Measures against Financing of Terror-
ism (LMFT) obliges them to regulate the measures for 
prevention against the said crime. 
For the purposes of this paper, the "terrorist finan- 
cing" category is under analysis. As an activity in the 
Criminal Code2 , terrorism is associated with a crime re-
lated to the illegal use or the danger of using force or 
                                                        
1 See Art. 2, para. 1 of the Credit Institutions Act (last amended SG No. 63 of 04.08.2017. 
2 See Art. 108a of the Penal Code (last amended SG 54 of 05.07.2017). 
3 See § 1, item 3 of the Supplementary Provision of the Act on Measures Against the Financing of Terrorism (last amended 
01.01.2017). 
4 See Art. 2 of the Act on Measures Against the Financing of Terrorism (last amended 01.01.2017). 
5 See Art. 3, para. 1 of the Act on Measures Against the Financing of Terrorism (last amended 01.01.2017). 
violence by a person or organized group against people 
or property with the intention of exerting coercion or 
threat against the public or state organs - for example for 
ideological or political reasons. In the legal framework, 
"terrorist financing" relates to the "direct or indirect, un-
lawful and deliberate provision and/or collection of 
funds and other financial assets or economic resources 
and / or the provision of financial services with the in-
tention of being used or conscious that they will be used 
wholly or partly for terrorism within the meaning of the 
Penal Code"3. 
With a view to protecting the international finan-
cial system, the Financial Action Task Force against 
Money Laundering (FATF), as an organization that sets 
standards in countering money laundering and terrorist 
financing, formulates special recommendations to pre-
vent terrorist financing focusing on key mechanisms 
used by terrorist organizations to transfer capital: money 
transfers, electronic transfers and non-profit legal enti-
ties. In addition, the special law applicable in a national 
aspect (LMFT), which aims to "Prevent and Disclose the 
Action of Individuals, Legal Entities, Groups and Or-
ganizations Focused on the Financing of Terrorism"4, 
indicates measures in respect of the persons liable, ch. 
commercial banks to counteract this type of crime as fol-
lows5: 
• Customer Identification, Verification and Verifi-
cation of Compliance with Restriction Lists; 
• Implementation of additional identification and 
verification measures, follow-up on the basis of risk as-
sessment; 
• Blocking of cash, financial assets or other pro- 
perty; 
• Prohibition to provide financial services, cash, fi-
nancial assets or other property; 
• Reporting in case of doubt or when implementing 
a measure under the LMFT. 
In the relationships with their clients, credit institu-
tions are obliged to apply the legal measures in cases 
where the participants in the operation (the account 
owner, the beneficiary) are from countries known to 
support terrorist activities and organizations. Charities, 
non-profit legal entities, companies with no real activity, 
and others without legal cause are often used for the pur- 
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pose of terrorist financing. The law also includes cases 
where there is no comprehensive information about the 
parties and the reason for the operation, operations and 
transactions are executed without the presence of the cli-
ent or using new technical means, etc. 
When establishing the appropriate prerequisites for 
terrorist financing operations carried out through com-
mercial banks, the blocking of all cash, financial assets 
and other property - property of the persons listed in the 
restriction lists (see Article 5 of the LMFT) ) irrespec-
tive of the place of their possession, as well as any cash, 
financial assets and other property held in possession of, 
held or controlled by the persons listed. Immediately 
blocking the funds of persons in full compliance with 
the EU's restrictive lists for the implementation of UN 
resolutions (Resolution 1267/2000 et seq.) And under 
the relevant EU acts as well as funds or other assets 
wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indi-
rectly, by persons on lists, terrorists, terrorist financing 
or terrorist organizations and others that are generated 
by the above mentioned funds or assets. 
The above-mentioned essential features and nor-
mative justification of terrorist financing processes are 
sufficient grounds for each commercial bank to set up in 
its structure a specialized service for controlling and pre-
venting the financing of terrorism to organize and con-
trol the implementation of the legal measures1. Conse-
quently, in performing its core business, each commer-
cial bank should monitor and prevent terrorist financing 
processes in accordance with national law and relevant 
international regulations and best practices by develop-
ing its own policy of prevention measures against use of 
the bank for the above purposes. 
As an initial measure to prevent the use of the bank 
to finance terrorism, the processes of identification and 
assessment of bank customers, as well as those related 
to the monitoring of banking operations and the defini-
tion of some of them as suspect by Chief Operating Of-
ficer, ie the existing risk, are complex and require an  
adequate material base at the disposal of the bank, incl. 
specialized software applications, time resource, expert 
potential. The main goal is to "block" the relationship 
between credit institutions and criminals. 
On the basis of the regulated and applicable in the 
banking practice measures against the financing of ter-
rorism, each credit institution should write an internal 
policy, rules and procedures to prevent its use for the 
purpose of financing terrorism. In this connection and in 
view of the above analysis, the following may be formu-
lated as exemplary principles: 
• The Bank should not engage in relationships with 
persons who are known to have been convicted or 
charged with crimes such as terrorist financing; 
                                                        
1 See Art. 1 of the Law on Measures against Money Laundering (last amended 01.01.2017) 
2 See more art. 32e of the Regulations for Implementation of the State Agency for National Security Act (adopted with 
Decree of the Council of Ministers No 23 of 11.02.2008, promulgated in State Gazette, issue 17 of February 19, 2008, amended 
and supplemented SG .63 of 12 August 2016, SG No. 66 of 23 August 2016 
• The Bank should not engage in any relationship 
with individuals, legal entities and groups believed to be 
related to criminal activities, members of criminal or ter-
rorist organizations, or that they support politically or 
fund such organizations; 
• The Bank must not open or operate anonymous 
accounts and accounts of fictitious names, perform fic-
titious transactions and transactions, and accept funds 
and property suspected of being acquired through or in 
connection with a crime or will be used to fund such. 
Commercial banks should not enter into relation-
ships and do not provide financial services, funds, finan-
cial assets and other property to the persons included in 
the list of natural persons, legal persons, groups and or-
ganizations to which the measures under the LMFT ap-
ply. In the event that a person included in the above list 
is a client of the bank, his funds, financial assets and 
other property are blocked. Payments and other disposi-
tions with the blocked accounts, cash and financial as-
sets are made with the permission of the Minister of Fi-
nance. In addition, when there are suspicions that certain 
operations or transactions are directed to the financing 
of terrorism, bank officers are required to immediately 
notify the specialized internal intelligence service for 
the control and prevention of money laundering and ter-
rorist financing of all additional facts and circumstances 
famous. In the event of a suspicion of terrorist financing, 
the Bank shall notify the Ministry of Interior and the 
State Agency "National Security" (Article 9a of the 
LMFT). In addition, the Bank shall report immediately 
any significant suspicions of terrorist financing that are 
likely to have a significant reputation for the Bank or its 
financial position, such as cases involving senior go- 
vernment officials or amounts over the statutory certain 
dimensions. 
The following report analyzes the SANS control-
ling activity of credit institutions in the field of "terrorist 
financing" on the basis of historical data publicly dis-
closed through annual reporting documents. Realizing 
its core business, incl. falling under the scope of the 
LMFT, commercial banks are subject to constant moni-
toring and control by the specialized administrative di-
rectorate "Financial Intelligence" of SANS, which has 
neither operational functions nor criminal detection 
functions but has a legal basis for collecting information 
without any limitation of banking, professional, profes-
sional or other secrecy as an intermediary unit for acce- 
lerating and facilitating the exchange of information  
between financial and law enforcement systems. 
Based on the applicable legal norms, among the 
main functions performed by the Directorate, incl. and 
in respect of commercial banks2: 
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• Organizing and conducting seminars, workshops 
and other forms of training related to the implementation 
of the LMFT on its own or jointly with the supervisory 
bodies of the credit institutions; 
• Current and incidental control of the commercial 
banks for the fulfillment of the obligations under the 
LMFT, as well as the acts for their implementation, incl. 
drafting of acts of observation, acts for establishing ad-
ministrative violations under the LMFTS and drafting of 
draft penal decrees; 
• Develop reports on violations by commercial 
banks, including an analysis of the breaches and pro-
posals for the measures to be taken to erase the conse-
quences of the violations and to prevent future viola-
tions; 
• Interaction with other state bodies, carrying out 
inspections, incl. jointly with the oversight bodies (Bul-
garian National Bank) on the activities of commercial 
banks in the implementation of measures against terror-
ist financing, as well as in the case of suspicion of fi-
nancing of terrorism; 
• Keeping registers of information received from 
commercial banks (including terrorist financing), ex- 
change of information with security and public order 
services at national and supranational level, financial in-
telligence analysis, gathering of additional information, 
giving of conclusions, sending of files to the relevant 
state services, etc. 
As stated above, the function of the Directorate for 
the organization and conduct of trainings on the imple-
mentation of the LMFT is a priority, as the educational 
level and the competences acquired are a factor for in-
creasing the efficiency in the fight against the financing 
of terrorism. Summing up the information published in 
the annual reports of the FAS - SANS, for the period 
2012-2016, the Directorate carried out a total of 73 train-
ings, resulting in the training of 2454 persons in the ca-
pacity of representatives of the Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (ICPA) , Commercial Banks, Non-
Profit Legal Entities (NGOs), the National Revenue 
Agency (NRA), real estate agents and others. As illus-
trated in Figure 1, the number of trainings of commer-
cial banks represented 22% in the structure of the train-
ings, which gave them a second position after the train-
ings of representatives of the ICPA (26%). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Structure of the trainings conducted by SAD FR-SANS in connection with the implementation  
of the LMML and the LMFT (2012-2016) 
 
Similarly, commercial banks also occupy 14% of 
the number of trained persons, compared to 33% for the 
leader – ICPM. Considering that the number of banks 
(including their employees) operating on the Bulgarian 
market is considerably smaller than the number of certi-
fied accountants, it can be assumed that for the FAS – 
SANS the commercial banks are priority institutions for 
the prevention of money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism, mainly because of their specific activity –  
operating not only on their own, but also on attracted 
                                                        
1 See. by detailed Dochev, H., Challenges of new legal entities on the European internal market, Challenges of economic 
science and practice in the process of joining the European Union, Nis, 2007, p. 319-330. 
money, which poses a serious risk to their real origin. 
For the next 10% comparison, the number of trainings 
conducted by representatives of NGOs and NRA, fol-
lowed by 7% by the real estate agents. The remaining 
25% are outside the reach of the positioning, as they in-
clude all training with a share of less than 5% in the total 
number of courses, incl. investment intermediaries, 
management companies, insurers1, insurance intermedi-
aries, financial institutions, pension insurance compa-
nies, Financial Supervision Commission (FSC), leasing 
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companies, lawyers, postal operators, private enforce-
ment agents, traders, notaries, state and local bodies. 
On the basis of the information presented in Table 
1, trends in training can be traced. Following the above 
considerations, the factual data showing the persistence 
in the training of two categories of institutions through-
out the analyzed period, including the commercial banks 
with two trainings and 50 trained persons in the first 
year – 2012 (the lowest values for the period) and five 
training sessions with 150 trained persons in 2015 (the 
highest values for the period). Concerning the others 
presented, trainings were carried out once (NRA – 2012) 
or a maximum of twice (NGOs and real estate agents – 
2012 and 2014) throughout the time slice. 
 
Table 1 
Trainings conducted by SAD FR-SANS in connection with the implementation  
of the LMML and the LMFT (2012-2016)1 
Institutions 
2012 2014 2015 2016 
Number 
of train-
ings 
Number 
of trained 
persons 
Number 
of train-
ings 
Number 
of trained 
persons 
Number 
of train-
ings 
Number 
of trained 
persons 
Number 
of train-
ings 
Number 
of trained 
persons 
1 Institute of 
certified pub-
lic account-
ants 5 257 5 176 5 185 4 200 
2 Commercial 
banks 2 50 3 76 5 150 3 56 
3 Non-profit le-
gal entities 6 213 1  
4 National 
Revenue 
Agency 7 278  
5 Real estate 
agents 4 113 1 14  
6 Other 7 233 8 266 3 110 4 77 
Total: 31 1144 18 532 13 445 11 333 
 
According to the applicable regulations, commer-
cial banks are obliged to report to the FAD - SANS the 
so-called dubious operations. As such, financial opera-
tions are classified and, after further studies by bank em-
ployees, it is not possible to clarify their nature, which 
is sufficient to be assigned a higher risk, and to the cat-
egory of "suspicious transactions". In case of suspicion 
of terrorist financing, the bank employee must: 
• Delay the execution of the suspicious transaction, 
if possible, and immediately notify the bank branch line; 
• Collect information on the essential elements of 
the operation, relevant supporting documents and other 
identification data; 
• Indicate in chronological order all the details of 
the suspect case, including any circumstances that ap-
pear unusual, irregular or questionable; 
• Keep all facts and circumstances secret; 
• Disclose to the line the entire available infor-
mation about the client and his operations by completing 
a special form. 
When the additional studies carried out by the spe-
cialized internal service for control and prevention of 
                                                        
1 The information is summarized and processed by the author on the basis of published annual reports of the SAD FR - 
SANS (http://www.dans.bg/bg/msip-091209-menu-bul/fidannualreports30052012-mitem-bul). 
 
terrorism financing can not establish a good reason or a 
logical economic explanation for the implementation of 
unusual behavior, the case is reported to SANS. The 
data and documents collected by the bank are used only 
for the purposes of the LMFT. 
The official information sources indicate that 
10930 suspicious transactions were reported for the pe-
riod 2011-2016, 76% of which were commercial banks 
and the other from other institutions (see Figure 2). 
As can be seen from Table 2, the number of reports 
on suspicious transactions under the LMML and LMFT 
from the commercial banks to the FAS - SANS ADS has 
an upward trend, in 2011 it is 1035 and in 2016 it is 
2390, ie. there is over 130% growth within the observed 
time span. It should be borne in mind that in the structure 
of generally reported suspicious transactions by years, 
commercial banks' DSBs take values of 69% in 2012 
(minimum) to 82% in 2015 (maximum), regardless of 
the above-mentioned upward trend the analyzed period, 
due to the fluctuations in the value of STR by other in-
stitutions. 
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Fig. 2. Sources of suspicious transaction reports (STR) under the LMML  
and LMFT for the period 2011-2016 
 
 
Table 2 
Reports on suspicious transactions under the LMML  
and the LMFT for the period 2011-2016 (number)1 
Period 
Suspicious transaction 
reports (commercial 
banks) 
Suspicious transaction 
reports (other 
institutions) 
Suspicious transaction 
reports (total) 
2011 1035 393 1428 
2012 1257 564 1821 
2013 1592 641 2233 
2015 2013 448 2461 
2016 2390 597 2987 
2011-2016: 8287 2643 10930 
 
Realizing its main functions in the area of preven-
tion against terrorist financing, FAS – SANS points out 
among the main indicators and risks (including in rela-
tion to commercial banks) concerning the financing of 
global terrorism the following2: 
• Opening an account with false identification and 
using fake documents when ordering/receiving transla-
tions; 
• Providing the same mobile phone numbers, ad-
dresses or job information to different people when 
opening accounts or ordering money transfers; 
• Receiving cash transfers through fast pay systems 
from individuals with locations in countries around  
conflict zones; 
• Use of mobile payment systems to perform trans-
actions, account balance checking, access to electronic 
portfolios and other online services without the physical 
                                                        
1 The information is summarized and processed by the author on the basis of published annual reports of the SAD FR - 
SANS (http://www.dans.bg/bg/msip-091209-menu-bul/fidannualreports30052012-mitem-bul). 
2 URL: http://www.dans.bg/images/stories/FID/ANNUAL%20REPORT_2016.pdf. 
presence of the client (sequential logging from a mobile 
phone or other device from different IP addresses from 
nearby locations or within them conflict zones); 
• Fundraising through public funding platforms for 
extremist purposes, often camouflaged in the form of 
charity transactions; 
• Financial transactions relating to antiques from 
conflict zones (including coins) put up for sale on the 
Internet, and in particular in the so- "Dark net" or social 
networks. 
The above analysis is sufficient grounds, on a na-
tional scale, for the commercial banks to be constituted 
as a priority subject of permanent monitoring and con-
trol by the specialized administrative directorate "Finan-
cial Intelligence" of SANS in order to study, analyze and 
disclose information received under the procedure and 
at the conditions of the LMFT, as they are obviously 
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among the main options used for the purposes of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 
In summary, the main statement of the study pro-
vides the basis for the following conclusions: 
First. Credit institutions are among the key mech-
anisms for terrorist financing, which is a prerequisite for 
the eventual occurrence of risk situations for the bank 
itself and for its clients. Each commercial bank should 
develop its own terrorist financing policy that contains 
adequate measures to counteract these crimes and their 
application to "block" the relationship between credit in-
stitutions and criminals. 
Second. Measures to prevent the use of the bank 
for terrorist financing purposes should be aimed at: 
identifying customers and actual owners and taking ap-
propriate action to verify their identification; customer 
assessment; monitoring customer operations; disclosure 
of information (reporting) about suspicious transactions. 
Third. The activities of credit institutions are sub-
ject to constant monitoring in relation to the application 
of a number of regulations and institutions concerning 
the role of banks in complying with the legal norms 
against terrorist financing. In order to have an effect, it 
is necessary to develop and strictly implement policies 
both nationally and internationally, to be implemented 
in close cooperation and constant communication bet-
ween the responsible institutions. 
Fourth. On a national scale, commercial banks 
have been constituted as a priority subject of continuous 
monitoring and control by the specialized administrative 
directorate "Financial Intelligence" of the State Agency 
for National Security (SANS) in order to investigate, an-
alyze and disclose information received under the terms 
and conditions of the LMML and as they are among the 
main options used for money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing purposes. 
Fifth. For the period 2012 - 2016, SAD FR-SANS 
conducted a total of 73 trainings on the implementation 
of the LMML and LMFT with trained 2454 persons, in-
cluding commercial banks with 22% of the total train-
ings and 14% of the total trainees. identifies them as pri-
ority institutions with regard to the prevention of money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, mainly be-
cause of their specific activities – operating not only on 
their own, but also on attracted money containing a se-
rious risk in terms of their real origin. 
Sixth. During the period 2011-2016, 10930 suspi-
cious transactions under the LMML and LMFT were re-
ported to the SAD FR – SANS, of which 76% of the 
commercial banks (with over 130% growth within the 
observed time interval) and the rest from the other insti-
tutions. For the same period, notifications of payment 
                                                        
1 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering - the organization that sets standards in countering money laundering 
and terrorist financing. 
2 An organization responsible for Europe for the prevention of money laundering. 
3 See more https://www.egmontgroup.org/. 
4 See more http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#classification. 
transactions in cash over BGN 30000, 99% (251600) 
were reported by the commercial banks, and their rela-
tive share varied between 98% and 99% during the same 
period, which is sufficient grounds for taking the neces-
sary legal measures to prevent money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 
In order to have an effect on the implementation of 
statutory, regulatory and internal commercial bank reg-
ulations on the prevention of terrorist financing as well 
as monitoring and control procedures in relation to their 
core business, close cooperation between credit institu-
tions and competent authorities dealing with suspicious 
customers and financial operations. Supranational level 
policy for combating the financing of terrorism is deter-
mined by the activity of a number of institutions, includ-
ing the Task Force on financial measures Anti-Money 
Laundering (FATF1 - Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering), the Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Laundering money the Council of Europe 
(MONEYVAL Committee2), the Union for increasing 
interaction between financial intelligence units world-
wide (GROUP EGMONT3), the Basel Committee on 
Banking supervision (Basel Committee of Banking su-
pervision4), the world Bank, the International Curren-
cies fund and others. For the implementation of interna-
tional and national regulations regarding prevention 
against the financing of terrorism, a number of law en-
forcement, control and supervisory state institutions are 
operating in Bulgaria - Specialized Administrative Di-
rectorate "Financial Intelligence" of the State Agency 
for National Security (SAD FR - SANS), Ministry of the 
Interior, the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Bul-
garia, the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), the Control-
ling Agencies at the Ministry of Finance, etc. At the 
same time, the improvement and modernization of the 
national and supranational regulatory framework is a 
sine qua non for real countering the latest criminal prac-
tices for which priority is being given and to credit in-
stitutions. 
 
*** 
The above analysis is sufficient grounds, on a na-
tional scale, for the commercial banks to be constituted 
as a priority subject of permanent monitoring and con-
trol by the specialized administrative directorate "Finan-
cial Intelligence" of SANS in order to study, analyze and 
disclose information received under the procedure and 
at the conditions of the LMFT because they are obvi-
ously among the main options used for the purpose of 
financing terrorism. For this reason, the global policy 
regarding the fight against the mentioned crime places 
the activity of the credit institutions on the legal norms 
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and the focus of their activities in order to prevent their 
use for the implementation of criminal schemes. This is 
a good reason for credit institutions to set strict and 
transparent internal bank rules and procedures to be re-
spected when selecting clients and executing financial 
operations and to prioritize the prevention of their use 
for the purpose of financing terrorism. 
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Дімітрова Т. Комерційні банки як механізм 
проти фінансування тероризму 
У процесі глобалізації необхідність блокування 
фінансових потоків у терористичні організації стає 
все більш відчутною. Боротьба з фінансуванням те-
роризму стає національним і наднаціональним пріо-
ритетом, а кредитні установи є одним з основних ме- 
 
 
ханізмів здійснення таких злочинів і тому охоплю-
ються численними положеннями та інститутами, що 
стосуються їх ролі в контролі та їх запобіганню. 
Мета цього дослідження – описати місце комерцій-
них банків у процесах фінансування тероризму, 
представивши їх невід'ємні характеристики в рам-
ках Спеціального закону про заходи щодо фінансу-
вання тероризму. 
Ключові слова: глобалізація, комерційні банки, 
тероризм, фінанси, механізм. 
 
Димитрова Т. Коммерческие банки как ме-
ханизм против финансирования терроризма 
В процессе глобализации необходимость бло-
кирования финансовых потоков в террористические 
организации становится все более ощутимой. 
Борьба с финансированием терроризма становится 
национальным и наднациональным приоритетом, а 
кредитные учреждения являются одним из основ-
ных механизмов совершения таких преступлений и 
поэтому охватываются многочисленными положе-
ниями и институтами, касающимися их роли в кон-
троле и их предотвращении. Цель этого исследова-
ния – описать место коммерческих банков в процес-
сах финансирования терроризма, представив их 
неотъемлемые характеристики в рамках Специаль-
ного закона о мерах по финансированию терро-
ризма. 
Ключевые слова: глобализация, коммерческие 
банки, терроризм, финансы, механизм. 
 
Dimitrova T. Commercial banks as a mecha-
nism against financing terrorism 
In the process of globalization, the need to block 
financial flows to terrorist organizations is becoming 
more and more tangible. The fight against terrorist fi-
nancing is becoming a national and supranational prior-
ity, and credit institutions are among the main mecha-
nisms for committing such crimes, and are therefore 
covered by numerous regulations and institutions con-
cerning their role in controlling and preventing them. 
The purpose of this study is to outline the commercial 
banks' place in terrorist financing processes by present-
ing their inherent characteristics within the scope of the 
Special Act on Measures Against Financing of Terror-
ism. 
Keywords: globalization, commercial banks, ter-
rorism, finance, mechanism. 
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